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Introduction  
 
A domestic common law court is faced with an application to enforce a judgment issued 
by foreign court X.  However, the judgment issued by court X is apparently inconsistent 
with another judgment previously rendered by foreign court Y.  In addition, the action of 
court X in issuing the judgment may involve a breach of comity towards court Y.  What 
should the domestic enforcing court do?  What factors should the enforcing court consider 
when deciding whether the enforcement of the judgment rendered by court X is contrary 
to public policy on grounds of comity?  In Compania Sud Americana De Vapores SA v 
Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd,1 Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers sitting in the Hong 
Kong Court of Final Appeal articulated important principles and guidelines in these areas 
of private international law and the doctrine of comity.   He identified the key factors the 
enforcing court should consider when evaluating whether the enforcement of a judgment 
rendered by foreign court X is contrary to public policy on grounds of comity, and whether 
the judgment of court X conflicts with another judgment previously issued by foreign court 
Y on the same issue.  Several aspects of Lord Phillips’ reasoning warrant further discussion 
and elucidation.   
 
 
Facts and Issues 
 
Placing these hypothetical issues into their actual context, the enforcing court is the Hong 
Kong court.  Foreign court X is the English court, and foreign court Y is the Chinese court.  
In this case, a carrier (the claimant Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA (CSAV)) 
issued a series of bills of lading to a Hong Kong company (Hin-Pro) covering the carriage 
of cargo from various mainland Chinese ports (including Ningbo and Nanjing) to 
Venezuela.  Hin-Pro suffered huge losses when CSAV allegedly delivered the 
consignments to the wrong parties without presenting the bills of lading.  The bills of lading 
provided: 
 
Clause 23: Law and jurisdiction 
This Bill of Lading and any claim or dispute arising hereunder shall be subject to 
English law and the jurisdiction of the English High Court of Justice in London.  If, 
notwithstanding the foregoing, any proceedings are commenced in another 
jurisdiction, such proceeding shall be referred to ordinary courts of law … 
   
A key issue in the case was whether Clause 23 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the 
English court.  Hin-Pro took the view that the second sentence divested the English court 
of exclusive jurisdiction, and it commenced proceedings in various Chinese Maritime 
Courts.  Upon appeal from the first instance decision made by the Ningbo Maritime Court,2 
                                                 
1 [2016] HKCFA 79. 
2 Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA (2013) YHFSCZ no 523 
dated 16 October 2013 (Ningbo Maritime Court, China).  The relevant paragraphs of the English translation 
of this judgment were cited by Lord Phillips of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (note 1 at [10]). 
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in December 20133 the Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang delivered a final and conclusive 
judgment concerning jurisdiction.  It affirmed the first instance decision of the Ningbo 
Maritime Court by holding that the lower court had jurisdiction over bill of lading disputes 
under Clause 23.  Although Clause 23 included a choice of English law and English 
jurisdiction, the Zhejiang Court ruled that the English court’s jurisdiction was non-
exclusive.4  
 
The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal summarised the relevant factors5 considered by the 
Ningbo Maritime Court.  Specifically, the place where CSAV was domiciled, the place 
where the bill of lading was entered into and performed, and the place where the subject 
matter was located were all outside the United Kingdom.  Furthermore, the cargo was 
loaded in the port of Ningbo, China.  Forming the view that the English jurisdiction clause 
did not have any actual connection with the cargo claims, the Chinese court held that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case.  It appears that in deciding which forum had the most 
substantial nexus with the disputed bill of lading, the Chinese court considered an array of 
connecting factors that were similar to the principles of English private international law 
as stated by Lord Goff in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex: 6 
 
… Lord Keith in The Abidin Daver … referred to the ‘natural forum’ as being ‘that 
with which the action has the most real and substantial connection’.  So it is for 
connecting factors in this sense that the court must first look; and these will include 
not only factors affecting convenience or expense (such as the availability of 
witnesses), but also other factors such as the law governing the relevant transaction 
… and the places where the parties respectively reside or carry on business (see The 
Abidin Daver7). 
 
 
Ten months after the final decision on jurisdiction was made by the Higher People’s Court 
of Zhejiang, in October 2014 the English Commercial Court8 ruled on jurisdiction over the 
same parties (CSAV and Hin-Pro) with respect to the same bill of lading dispute.  This 
ruling appeared to be in conflict with the previous Chinese judgments.9   The English 
Commercial Court construed the jurisdiction clause as being ‘exclusive’ in the context of 
                                                 
3 Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA v Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd (2013) ZXZZ no 144 dated 
20 December 2013 (Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang).  The judgment was delivered by Justice Zhang, 
Justice Lin and Justice Cai.  It is available on Westlaw China.  Lord Phillips referred only to the first instance 
decision on jurisdiction made by the Ningbo Maritime Court (see n 2). 
4 See the fifth paragraph of the judgment of the Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang (n 3).  It is noteworthy 
that after CSAV’s unsuccessful challenge of the jurisdiction of Ningbo Maritime Court, CSAV fully defended 
the substantive cargo claims in both Ningbo Maritime Court (first instance, in May 2014) and the Higher 
People’s Court of Zhejiang (on appeal, in October 2015), and successfully obtained the final judgment against 
Hin-Pro from the Higher People’s Court of Zhejiang (see note 1 above at [13] and [29]).  The substantive 
cargo claims were never tried before the English court. 
5 Note 2. 
6 [1986] 3 WLR 972, 987. 
7 [1984] AC 398, 415. 
8 Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA [2014] EWHC 3632 
(Comm). 
9 Notes 2 and 3. 
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the ‘contractual background’, even though the word ‘exclusive’ did not appear in the clause 
and the first sentence was immediately followed by a second one ostensibly allowing 
proceedings to be commenced in another jurisdiction.  The English Commercial Court took 
the view that foreign proceedings could only be commenced if they were mandatory under 
an international convention (the Hamburg Rules), which might have been applicable under 
some circumstances to other shipments handled by the same carrier (CSAV), albeit 
unrelated to the present disputes involving Hin-Pro.   
 
Cooke J of the English Commercial Court awarded damages to CSAV for Hin-Pro’s breach 
of the English jurisdiction clause which, according to his interpretation of the bill of lading, 
vested exclusive jurisdiction in the English court.  Moreover, in furtherance of enforcing 
the award of damages, he granted a final anti-suit injunction and a Mareva freezing order 
by affirming the interim anti-suit injunction10 and an ex parte Mareva freezing order11 
covering Hin-Pro’s worldwide assets.  Cooke J appeared to disagree with the approach 
adopted by the Chinese court, positing that ‘… Chinese courts apparently disregard agreed 
jurisdiction clauses where the circumstances of the case have little or nothing to do with 
the agreed jurisdiction’.12  The decision of the English Commercial Court was affirmed by 
the English Court of Appeal in February 2015.13 
 
 
Foreign Judgments and Comity 
 
 
Having obtained the award of damages and the Mareva freezing order granted by the 
English Commercial Court in October 2014, CSAV sought to enforce the freezing order in 
Hong Kong, where Hin-Pro had substantial assets.  Lord Phillips, sitting in the Hong Kong 
Court of Final Appeal, identified the key issues concerned with recognising two 
inconsistent judgments.  The Hong Kong court had the power to grant relief in support of 
proceedings commenced outside of its jurisdiction under s 21M of the High Court 
Ordinance, which is the Hong Kong equivalent of s 25 of the Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Act of 1982, applicable in England. Section 25(b) provides:  
 
On an application for any interim relief under subsection (1) the court may refuse 
to grant that relief if, in the opinion of the court, the fact that the court has no 
jurisdiction apart from this section in relation to the subject-matter of the 
proceedings in question makes it inexpedient for the court to grant it. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The ex parte injunction was granted by Burton J, whereas the inter parte injunction was granted by Andrew 
Smith J in the interlocutory proceedings in November 2012.  See n 8 at [8]. 
11 It was granted by Walker J in June 2014.  See n 8 at [13]. 
12 See n 8 at [9]. 
13 Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA v Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 401; 
[2015] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1. 
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As a precondition, the Hong Kong court needed to consider whether the foreign 
proceedings could result in a judgment and whether that judgment was one the Hong Kong 
court may enforce.14  In this respect, Lord Phillips averred:15 
 
The Hong Kong Court has not been asked to assist the English Court to enforce an 
exclusive jurisdiction clause.  It has been asked to assist in enforcing an award of 
damages by the English Court for breach of such a clause.  If the action of the 
English Court in awarding such damages involved a breach of comity towards the 
PRC Courts, then I accept that to assist in enforcing those damages might also 
involve a breach of comity.  In that case enforcement of any judgment would seem 
open to objection on grounds of public policy and the Mareva should have been 
refused for that reason. 
 
To summarise the tests formulated by Lord Phillips, if foreign court X has rendered a 
judgment that may arguably involve a breach of comity towards foreign court Y, then the 
enforcing court must independently make an assessment of whether or not it does so.  If 
the enforcing court finds that a breach of comity has occurred, then it should not enforce 
the judgment rendered by court X because, from the domestic court’s perspective, doing 
so would be repugnant to the public policy at common law on grounds of comity. 
 
The tests laid down by Lord Phillips are undoubtedly reasonable and convincing.  
Furthermore, they are premised on the well-established English common law principles of 
private international law.  Professor Richard Fentiman has pointed out that: 
 
[e]nforcement will be denied if the consequences of enforcing the judgment would 
be contrary to public policy.  In principle, an English court will deny enforcement 
to a foreign judgment on public policy grounds … [if] to enforce the judgment 
would be contrary to international comity. 16 
 
Although the tests laid down by Lord Phillips are reasonable and supported by the current 
common law principles of private international law, an important gap remains in applying 
the tests: knowing the exact principles that should guide the enforcing court’s 
determination of whether the action of court X constitutes a breach of comity towards court 
Y.  
 
In the present dispute, Lord Phillips opined that the action of the English court involved no 
such breach of comity towards the Chinese court.17  He stated the general principles that 
an anti-suit injunction issued in furtherance of enforcing an exclusive jurisdiction clause 
did not infringe judicial comity, even though it constituted an indirect interference with the 
process of a foreign court.  In support of his reasoning, he cited The Angelic Grace,18 in 
which a foreign court action was initiated by a charterer against a shipowner in 
                                                 
14 Note 1 at [47]. 
15 Note 1 at [59]. 
16 R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (OUP 2010), 706-707. 
17 Note 1 at [55]–[58]. 
18 [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87. 
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contravention of a London arbitration clause contained in the charterparty.  Millett LJ 
held:19 
 
… there is no good reason for diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain foreign 
proceedings on the clear and simple ground that the defendant has promised not to 
bring them. … I cannot accept the proposition that any court would be offended by 
the grant of an injunction to restrain a party from invoking a jurisdiction which he 
had promised not to invoke … 
 
With all due respect, the facts and decision in The Angelic Grace can be distinguished from 
the present case.  In this case, the jurisdiction clause involving CSAV and Hin-Pro was far 
from ‘clear and simple’.  It is questionable whether Hin-Pro had indeed ‘promised not to 
invoke’ jurisdiction in a forum other than the English court, given that the jurisdiction 
clause was both uncertain and ambiguous in its meaning.  An unrelated dispute involving 
the same carrier CSAV helps to illustrate how ambiguous the jurisdiction clause was.  In 
Import Export Metro Ltd v Compania Sud Americana de Vapores S.A.,20 CSAV issued bills 
of lading to a Hong Kong company to carry goods from Hong Kong (and other Chinese 
ports) to Chile.  The bills contained a jurisdiction clause identical to the clause set out 
previously.  The Hong Kong bill of lading holder commenced legal proceedings in the 
English court against CSAV for wrongful delivery of the cargo.  CSAV vigorously argued 
that the jurisdiction clause was non-exclusive, and that the commencement of proceedings 
by the bill of lading holder in a non-exclusive English jurisdiction should be stayed on the 
ground of forum non conveniens.  CSAV submitted that: ‘Chile is clearly and distinctly 
the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute, and that in the interests of 
justice it should be determined there’.  The court held that, although the jurisdiction clause 
was non-exclusive, it would not stay the English proceedings as pleaded by CSAV because 
CSAV had failed to satisfy the English court that it was a forum non conveniens.   
 
 
Comment 
 
In light of the preceding analysis, it is submitted that the enforcing court should apply a 
new approach for evaluating whether the enforcement of a judgment rendered by court X 
constitutes a breach of comity towards court Y.  This new approach consists of two 
components. 
 
First, the judicial process through which court Y rendered its judgment must be compatible 
with the enforcing court’s views of natural justice.21  The principles of natural justice 
involve the opportunity for a full trial before a court of competent jurisdiction acting 
through a fair process; due service of process on the parties to the proceedings; the 
opportunity to present the case and address the factual and legal issues before the court; 
                                                 
19 Ibid at 96. 
20 [2003] EWHC 11 (Comm); [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 11. 
21 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1900] Ch 433; Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th edn, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2012), Rule 52 at [14-163]; P Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws (Cambridge 
University Press 2013), 256-257. 
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and the impartial administration of justice without prejudice, fraud or corruption in 
procuring the judgment.22 
 
Second, the action of court Y must not be regarded as patently discreditable by the 
enforcing court.   Examples of patently discreditable actions on the part of court Y include 
arbitrary denials of evidently valid exclusive jurisdiction clauses or arbitration agreements 
between the contractual parties.  Illustrations of evidently valid exclusive jurisdiction or 
arbitration clauses can be found in Donohue v Armco Inc. and Others23 (‘the parties hereby 
irrevocably submit themselves to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts to settle 
any dispute which may arise out of or in connection with this Agreement’) and The Angelic 
Grace24 (‘all disputes from time to time arising out of this contract shall … be referred to 
the arbitrament of two arbitrators carrying on business in London’). 
 
If the action of court Y is not considered by the enforcing court to be patently discreditable, 
and if the proceedings conducted in court Y do not offend the enforcing court’s views of 
natural justice, it is submitted that in enforcing a judgment rendered by court X, it will 
become impossible for the enforcing court to achieve a proper level of deference to both 
court X and court Y.  This is especially true when the judgment of court Y is the one that 
first existed in time.25  The impossibility of demonstrating deference to both foreign courts 
should be a good reason to justify abstention on the part of the enforcing court.  The 
enforcing court should, as far as possible, restrain from exercising its own authority to 
inquire into the relative merits of the differing conclusions arrived at by two foreign courts.  
The focus should instead fall on the need to accord judicial deference to the different 
rulings legitimately reached by the two foreign courts.  The enforcing court should, with 
all due respect, remain impartial and abstain from enforcing the judgment rendered by court 
X if non-interference or restraint is the only justifiable solution in light of the inevitable 
and legitimate conflicts between courts X and Y.  After all, for reasons of comity, the 
enforcing court does not have any role in mediating the clashes between two foreign courts 
operating under different legal systems with disparate legal traditions and policy 
orientations. 
                                                 
22 See Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113 (1895) (Supreme Court of the United States); Beals v Saldanha [2003] 3 
SCR 416 (Supreme Court of Canada)). 
23 [2001] UKHL 64. 
24 Note 21. 
25 Showlag v Mansour [1995] 1 AC 431 (PC), cited and analysed in P Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws 
(Cambridge University Press 2013), 260. 
